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Abstract 
This paper analyses welfare impacts of tax refOlms using a multisectoral general equi-
librium tax model with multiple capital assets for the UK economy with micro-consistent 
benchmark data set for the year the 1995 received from the In land Revenue. Households 
make consumption and labour leisure choices subject to their budget constraints, producers 
choose inputs to maximise profits. Prices adjust until demands equal supplies. Government 
revenue from the direct and indirect taxes finance public consumption and transf ers, 
Welfare gains from replacing existing capital income ta.x rates by a uniform 26.5 percent 
rate across sectors and assets are 0.035 percent ofGDP (£219 million) in equal yield case, 
0.28 p ercent of the GDP (1.8 billion) in no equal yield case. Tax induced changes in the 
relative prices of capital assets across sectors lead to reallocation of these assets among 
sectors. Producers tend to substitute capital for labour in a[fli culture, finance, p ublic ad-
ministration, and education sectors where capital inputs become relatively cheaper than 
labour inputs, Labour substitutes capital in manufacturing sec/or, where capital becomes 
relatively expensive aftcr a uniform tax reform. 
The marginal excess burden (MEB) of taxes varies according to the tax instmments in 
use, ranging from 35 pence in case of capital income taxes /0 54 pence per pound of ad-
ditional revenue from production taxes. 
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I. Introducti.on 
Ratio of tax revenue to the GDP in the UK fell to 33 percent in 1992-93 from 
around 39 percent 1982/83 and is rising back to that level gradually in recent years. 
Direct tax instruments such as the labour income tax, national insurance contri-
bution, and the council tax account for more than 50 percent of the tax revenue. 
Indirect sources that include value added tax (VAT), excise, corporate and other 
taxes make up the rest of it. While the government argues for new tax measures 
to raise the revenue to finance the increased demand for public services, there are 
genuine concerns about the rising and economy-wide distortionary impacts of these 
taxes. Which one of these tax instruments is the most efficient means of raising 
revenue? Which one of these has the least distortionary impact in the economy? 
How do these taxes affect the optimal choices of millions of households and firms 
in the economy? These are important questions of wide interest. A number of 
studies in the UK have tried to evaluate the impacts of taxes on labour supply and 
income distribution aspects in recent years using partial equilibrium approach 
(Giles and McCrae (T AXBEN:1983), Institute of Fiscal Studies (2002), Blundell-
Duncan and Meghir (2002» . As the optimising consumers and producers shift 
the burden of taxes to other economic agents continuously until the demand and 
supplies equal in each market a general equilibrium approach is more appropri-
ate method to measure these impacts of taxes. Partial equilibrium approach can 
significantly under or over estimate the impacts of taxes in the economy. An ap-
plied general equilibrium model can provide more accurate estimation of welfare 
by taking account of behaviour of households, firms, traders and the government 
while calculating the efficiency and resource allocation in the economy, which we 
aim to illustrate in this paper. 
Applied general equilibrium models for tax policy analysis have been in use for 
almost four decades3• This paper outlines the specification, calibration, replication 
as well application of a 16 sector general equilibrium tax-policy model to evaluate 
the efficiency and factor reallocation impacts as well as the marginal excess burden 
of equal yield tax reform in the UK economy. It uses the belilchmark data set for 
the year 1995 that were provided by the Economics Unit of the Inland Revenue 
as presented Tables Al to A3 in the appendix. 
This model has many features of a standard Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium 
model for an open economy (Arrow and Hahn (1971». Households maximise utility 
subject to their budget constraints. Their consumption and labour supply decisions 
influence producers' choices, aimed at maximising profits subject to technology 
constraints. The equilibrium conditions imply that the markets for goods, labour 
and capital clear, firms receive zero profits in equilibrium, income is equal to 
expenditure for households, investors and government, and the value of exports 
Some key references in app lied general eyu ilibriurn models are Harberger (1959), Shaven and 
Whalley (1972, 1977, 1984,1992) Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (BFSW(1985», Piggott and 
Whalley (1985),Taylor (1990), Robinson (1991), Mercinier and Srinivasan (1994), Rutherford 
(1997). The development of the mixed complementarity solution technique in 1990s, particularly 
with the GAMS/MPSGE software in recent years has made it easier to solve such large scale models 
(Brook, Kendrick and Meeraus (1992), Rutherford (1997), Dirkse and Ferris (1995, 1997» . 
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equals the value of imports. The government collects direct and indirect taxes from 
households on their income and consumption, production and capital income taxes 
from corporations, and import duties from traders. It spends revenue on public 
consumption or redistributes it as transfers to households. 
Internal consistency of a general equilibrium model is assured when a model 
reproduces the benchmark data set, with calibrated model parameters, as its solu-
tion4• For each tax policy scenario, we compute changes in total money metric ag-
gregate welfare by summing up money metric equivalent variations for households, 
investors and government. The money metric equivalent variation measures the 
amount of money required to compensate agents to move to the new equilibrium, 
from an old equilibrium with goods evaluated in terms of new prices. 
II. Specification of the General Equilibr ium Tax Model of the UK Economy 
a. Household preferences, demand structure and technology 
Utility of a representative household is assumed to be given by aCES func·· 
tion of leisure and composite consumption. A single household maximises utility, 
which is described by a nest of CES functions defined over composite consump·· 
tion and leisure, subject to a budget constraint including a composite price for the 
commodity and leisure. The composite commodity demand is derived from these 
for sub-composite goods (i =: 1, ... , N). Each of these sub composites is obtained 
from domestic and imported sources. At the top of the nest the utility function is 
written as 
1 
U = (aCQ + f3LP)Q (1) 
where U is the utility of household, C is the consumption of the composite good, 
L is the leisure taken by the household, a is the share of full income of household 
spent on consumption of the composite good, f3 is the share of full income spent 
on leisure, and (2 is the elasticity parameter in the utility function; the elasticity of 
substitution between goods (and leisure) being equal to 0=_1_. 
1 - (2 
Technically there are five steps in the numcricRI im.plementation of a general equilibrium model: 
benchmarking, modd declaration, benchmark replication, eounterfactual solution and report writ-
ing. Model dimensions (sets) are decla red and all base year data are read in tabular, parameter or 
scalar form in the base year model. Then modellers specify markets, production activities and budget 
constraints for each agent in the model declaration part. This part consist of blocks of equations 
fo r production technology, household preferences, revennes and income constraints. A model is 
calibrated when the base year data is reproduced by the model as its solution. This step is known 
as benchmark replication. In the fourth step various taxes or exogenous variables are changed in 
order to assess the efficiency and allocation effects of proposed changes in tax rates or transfers. 
Finally, model solutions are printed fo r review in the reporting stage. The MPSGE code is very 
concise for a standard Arrow-Debreu model. 
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The household receives income from capital and labour endowments, and 
transfers from the government, paying taxes on household and capital income. 
The disposable income of a household is given by 
H:= ",',' r· (1-- t . )8K J· + (1 t1) wI+ TR /-.I,L" } J,I J,l 
j i 
(2) 
where H is the income, Bi,j is the share of type j ':l:sset used in sector i, Kj is the 
endowment of capital type j for the household, L is the endowment of labour, 
TR are the transfers received, r is the rental rate of capital by type j, w is the wage 
rate, tl is the tax rate on labour incomeS, and tl,; is the tax rate in sector i on rental 
income from capital of type j. 
1'(1 +tv )C +W(l-tl)L:= H (3) 
where P and C are prices and quantities of composite goods respectively, and tv is 
the effective tax rate on consumption; consisting of tariffs, duties and levies, value 
added taxes and subsidies. 
The demand functions for goods and leisure are obtained by maximising (1) 
with respect to (2) and (3), and take the following form 
(4) 
Consumption of leisure is given by 
In the one household case, the labour supply of each household LS is given 
by the difference between the household labour endowment, and the demand for 
leisure, L. 
L S=L- L (6) 
In equilibrium, the labour supplied by the household must be consistent with 
the total demand for labour derived from the profit maximising behaviour of firms 
(as set out in the following section). 
Composite consumption covers N sub··composite goods in the model, 
(7) 
The effect of tax distortions on the labour-Ieisnrc choice can be captured through a subsidy to the 
consumption of leisure at rate 1/. 
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where CC is the ith good composite of domestic and imported consumption goods, 
1fJ is the unit parameter of the CES composite function and of is the share of the 
consumption good. The overall value of composite consumption should satisfy: 
for i = 1, ... , N (8) 
The term P is the price of composite consumption net of indirect taxes, and CC 
is composite consumption good of both domestic and import of the ith good. 
International Trade 
The total supply, Ai, for each sector is produced using domestic and imported 
goods, and is given by a CES Armington (1969) function as following: 
(9) 
where Ai is the CES aggregate of domestic supplies Di and import supplies Mi M 
is the share of domestic supplies for good i, and 0; is the share of imports in good 
i, am is the elasticity of substitution in the aggregate supply function, and <I> is the 
shift parameter of the aggregate supply function. Overall market clearing in the 
product market implies that 
A i = CC + Gi + Ii (10) 
where G i and Ii represent composite consumption by the government and invest-
ment respectively (discussed below). In value terms, 
(11) 
where Di and Mi are domestic and import supplies at prices PD, and PMi respectively, 
and P Ai is the price of total supply in sector i. 
In the above equation, domestic supply, D i , is the part of the output sold in 
the domestic market. The rest of domestic output is sold abroad, and given by the 
product transformation function. 
y =8[(1-0 e )Da~y-l + 0" Ea:,-ll~~~ 
l 1 t ~ l (12) 
where Ei is exports, Di is domestic supplies, ay is the elasticity of substitution in 
total supplies, 01 is the share of exports, and 8 is the shi ft parameter in the produc-
tion function. The total value of gross domestic product is composed of value of 
domestic sales and exports. 
PYi Yi = PDi Yi + PEl Ei (13) 
The value of exports is equal to the value of imports in equilibrium. 
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'LPEjEj = 'LPMjM j 
i 
(14) 
where PE; and PMi are the world prices of exported and imported commodities in 
terms of the numeraire. These import and export prices could be different than the 
domestic prices because of differentiation between domestic and foreign products 
in this model. Gross of export tax or tariff prices of domestic commodities tends 
to be close to the world prices as the elasticity of transformation between domes-
tic sales and exports and elasticity of substitution between domestic supplies and 
import reach to the infinity. 
Production 
Producers use labour and capital in each of N sectors to yield value added. This 
also is given by CES functions. 
1 
VA; o=Q;« l -oj)(Kj )Y; +oJLSY;)r, (15) 
where VAj is the gross value added of sector i, Q; is a shift parameter in the pro-
duction function, Ki and LSi are the amounts of capital and labour used in sector 
i , Oi is the share parameter of labour in the CES function, and Yi is the CES factor 
substitution parameter. 
The gross output of each sector Yi contains value added, VAi and intermediate 
inputs. We allow substitution between domestic and imported intermediate inputs, 
and between value added and intermediate inputs. 
PYY =PVVLf +" PA(l+td .)DI. +" PM (l+tm)MI . (16) III L.t.z ~ l t,l I .J ~ l t,l t tj 
j j 
where DIi,; is the demand for domestic intermediate input and MIi,j is demand for 
imported intermediate inputs, PVj is the composite price of value added, and VA; 
is the value added component of gross output, tZl and tTj are taxes on intermediate 
demands. 
At any set of prices, producers in each sector maximise profits subject to their 
technology constraint 
ili =pY;Y; -wLj - 'L1jKj,i - 'L PAj(l +t::'J)Mlj,i - 'L PAj(1 + tfj)Dlj,i (17) j,i j j 
where ilj is the profit of sector i. In equilibrium, factor demands by sectors are 
determined where the value of the marginal product of factors equal facto r prices, 
and there are no positive profits for producers. 
b. Treatment of the public sector 
Government Budget 
The government collects revenue from taxes on capital and labour income and 
value-added taxes on final demand, production taxes on intermediate inputs, and 
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tariffs on imports. All tax revenues collected are either used to purchase public 
goods or transferred to households in lump sum form; ie. 
, , l I L- z 1 l ~, I! L. G + TR = I I t)k ,.r)K), " + Itve p,cc + '" t vg FG. + '" t~k PI + '" t1wLS + 
j iii 1 i (18) 
+ I,ttMj + IIPAjt;''JMl j,ii + "iIPAli~jDlj,ij 
i j i j i 
where G is public consumption, and ttj is the tax rate on capital income from asset j used 
in sector i. These rates are taken from P-Tax formulae. There are four different indirect 
taxes in the model: tariffs, duties and levies, VAT and subsidies. t'/ is the effective ad 
valorem tax rate on final consumption of households, tiE is effective indirect tax rate on 
public consumption and lyk is effective tax rate on investment. t/ is the tax rate on labour 
income, and ti is the tariff on imports, ti~ and tV are taxes on intermediate demands. 
These taxes, particularly when they are levied at different rates on different 
sectors and households, have distortionary impacts on the allocation of resources 
in the economy. These are captured by the model. The value of government con,· 
sumption is given by: 
G = IPApDi + "iPAjGMj 
i 
(19) 
where GD j is government consumption of domestic goods and GMi is government 
consumption of imported goods. 
c. Model closures and savings and investmenlt 
Total investment demand I equals the use of investment goods from domestic 
and imported sources. 
(20) 
where IDi is investment demand for domestic good i , and IMi is investment demand 
for imported good i. The savings-investment identity closes this model where I is 
the gross of indirect taxes. 
We have taken a closed capital market view until so far. This essentially means 
the allocation of assets across sectors sums up to the domestic endowments of 
assets which implies :: 
K.=IK ) I,) 
i 
j = 1, .. . , 5 
where K j is the endowment of jth type of asset and Ki,j allocation of type j asset 
in sector i. Reallocation occurs until the rental rate of capital is same across all 
sectors. 
The closed capital market assumption is 110t realistic for the UK economy, 
where capital freely moves according to domestic and foreign rate of returns. 
More realistically 
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Xj + FKj = '2.,Ki ,j (22) 
I 
where F10 represents net inflow or outflow of asset type j. The inflow and outflow 
of capital asset depends upon the gap between the rental rate in the UK and the 
Rest of the World. 
rUK > rW => FK. > 0 j - j j- (23) 
UK < w F'K <0 
'j - 'j =>j- (24) 
where rpK is the net of tax return in asset j in the UK and rr is the net return in the 
world market. Thus the amount of inflow or outflow depends upon the gap between 
the domestic and world rental rate of capital. Capital asset movement occurs until 
this gap is eliminated. 
d. Model Equilibrium Conditions and Closure 
In this model a competitive equilibrium is given by prices of consumption 
goods,P;; the rental rate of capital assets rj; a wage rate for labour, w; levels of gross 
output, 1'; (gross of intermediate use); capital use, K;; and sectoral use of labour, 
L i; imports M;, exports X;, intermediate inputs INli.,j, investment Ii, government 
consumption G;, private consumption C, such that, 
i) The markets for goods and services, labour and capital clear; and 
ii) budget constraints of households, the government and investors are satisfied. 
More specifically, the market clearing condition for the goods market is given by 
3 
X;,! = '2., C;,h,! + Ii,! + GD;,! + INT;,! + DST;,! + TD;,!' 
h=l 
(25) 
where F;d = C;d + I;d + G:i + Ef is a decomposition of final demand into household 
consumption, investment, and government consumption, INT t = L(IO t * XD ) 
I, . l,j , j,t 
J 
is total intermediate demand, and ai,j is sector i input per unit of sector j output. 
N 
M = Fm + '2., amy 
I I j =l ij } (26) 
where F;m = C;m + It + Gi
m 
+ Et represents a decomposition of final demand for 
imports and INT;,! = }=UO;,j,t * XDj ,t) is total imports for intermediate inputs. 
j 
The capital market clearing condition, in the closed capital market case, im-
plies 
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Kj = 'LKi,j j =: 1, ",,5 
i 
(27) 
The capital market clearing condition in the open capital market scenario 
implies 
K j + FKj = 'LKi,j (28) 
I 
and labour market clearing implies: 
(29) 
where LD; represents labour demand in the ith sector. We have not considered 
mobility of labour to and from the UK economy explicitly in this modeL 
When there are n different markets in the economy, relative prices that clear 
n- 1 markets clear the nth market as welL Because of the complexity of the model, 
analytical solutions are difficult to find, therefore it needs to be solved by a nu-
merical technique. 
We use the Hicksian equivalent variation (EV) and compensating variations 
(CV) to measure welfare gain or loss between a benchmark and counterfactual 
tax reform scenarios. A general rule of thumb is that a positive Hicksian EV, as a 
result of reduction in tax rates, is a measure of welfare gain, and corresponds to a 
negative Hicksian CV, which gives the amount of money to be taken away from the 
consumer in order to keep her at the old utility leveL EV measure uses benchmark 
(old) prices to compute the money metric measure of utility while the CV measure 
uses new prices, As Shoven and Whalley (1992) present it, the EVand CV measures 
of money metric utility between a benchmark and counterfactual scenarios can be 
computed as following: 
(30) 
(31) 
superscripts Nand 0 represent new and old values of the variable on which they 
appear, and E is money metric utility, U the utility P the price level. If utility 
functions are linear homogeneous then the original and the new equilibria can 
be thought of in terms of a radial expansion in the utility surface. Therefore 
the change in welfare between benchmark and counterfactual solutions of the 
model is proportional to the change in income or the percentage change along 
the radial projection between two consumption points. A positive EV represents 
a gain compared to the old equilibrium and a negative EV represents a loss. For 
each tax reform scenario we express EVas a percentage of the UK GDP for the 
benchmark year. Then we check the robustness of the model results by computing 
the sensitivity of the EV/GDP ratio to a set of relevant substitution elasticities in 
consumption and production. 
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Numerical technique is used to solve the model as the analytical solutions for 
such model with 1462 variables and equations is very complex and almost impos-· 
sible to derive in algebraic form_ 
III. Effidency and. Reallocation Impacts of Capital Income and Indirect Tax 
Reform 
The major focus of this section is on evaluating the impacts of capital income 
taxes using the model outlined in the previous section using the base year tax rates 
as given in Table A4 and AS. We use the model mainly to assess the impacts of 
taxes on five types of capital assets, labour income taxes and four types of indirect 
taxes. The five types of capital assets are buildings, short and long lived plant and 
machinery, vehicles and dwellings; the four types of indirect taxes are import du .. 
ties, subsidies, duties and levies and value added taxes on intermediate and final 
demands. 
First, we consider four different scenarios to assess the impact of capital income 
taxes on the economy. These scenarios consist of moving to a uniform yield preserv-
ing 26.5 percent tax rate from the existing taxes for central and unit elasticity cases, 
and moving to a uniform 30 percent tax rate from the existing taxes without any 
equal yield requirements for low and high labour elasticity cases. The robustness 
of each of these experiments is checked by using model solutions for low (0.15) 
and high (0.3) values of labour supply elasticity. For each of these scenarios, we 
compute changes in total money metric aggregate welfare for the economy by 
summing up money metric equivalent variations for households, investors and the 
government. To be comprehensive, we take percentage changes in total money 
metric equivalent variations as a percentage of UK GDP for various alternative 
capital tax arrangements. Then we check the robustness of the model results by 
computing the sensitivity of the EV/GDP ratios of tax reforms for sets of substitution 
elasticities between capital and labour and among capital assets. This section also 
covers a short description of the effects of tax policy changes on the reallocation 
of capital assets and labour across sectors and their effects on output. 
We then present the marginal excess burdens of capital income taxes based 
on model solutions, followed by a brief summary of model results for reform in 
other indirect taxes and the replacement of household income taxes by lump sum 
taxes, 
a. EfIiciency effects of tax I'dorm 
We present a summary of results of capital income tax reform under four dif-
ferent scenarios in Table 1. The two scenarios in case A show welfare gains when 
capital income tax rates existing in 1995 (see Table A4) are replaced by a uniform 
26.5 percent rate across sectors and assets for a low labour supply elasticity. In the 
central case, we find an improvement in efficiency of 0.035 percent of UK GDP 
(£219 million in terms of 1995 prices) Note that the gross value added was 628 bil-
lion as given in the input-output table in A2. The improvement is 0.022 percent of 
UK GDP (£139 million) in the case of unit elasticity specification. 
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Table 1: Aggregate J1'elfare Results of Replacing Capital Income Taxes By Uniform Rates 
in Equal and No-equal-yield Cases (with labour supply elasticity of 0.15) 
A. Yield Case 
Tax Experiments 
Replacing the Existing Capital Income 
Taxes By Yield Preserving Uniform Rates 
Replacing the Existing Capital Income 
Taxes By Yield Preserving Uniform Rates 
(Unit elasticity case) 
Hicksian equivalent 
variation as % of 
GDP 
0.035 
0.022 
Hicksian compen-
sating variation as 
%ofGDP 
-0.036 
- 0.022 
B. No equal yield central elasticity case with low and high labour supply elasticities 
____ "''''''. __ ,.'''''' '"'"" ... . ",w.-_ ___ " II . _-="-"'W_ 
Tax expedments 
Replacing the Existing Capital Income 
Taxes Uniform Rates (Low 
Replacing the Existing Capital Income 
Taxes By Uniform Rates (High case) 
I! I'" ,.. .. _ 
Hicksian equivalent Hicksian com pen-
var·iation as % sating varia tion as 
ofCDP % ofGDP 
o. 281 -0.279 
0.283 -0.281 
Note: See section 4 for numerical values of substitution elasticities in central and unit cases. 
We relax the equal yield requirement in the no equal yield scenarios, in Cases 
B of Table 1. The size of government can, and usually does, change after the tax 
reform without any adjustment to other taxes. The efficiency gain from replacing 
existing taxes by uni.form capital income tax rates in the no equal yield capital tax 
reform was about 0.2S1 percent of UK GDP (1.8 billion pounds) for the low labour 
supply elasticity case and 0.283 percent for the high labour supply elasticity. 
In an earlier version of the model, the computed efficiency gain from replacing capi-
tal income tax by yield preserving lump-sum taxes was 0.3 percent of the UK GDP. 
The improvement in aggregate efficiency reported here reflects removal of 
distortions existing in the economy by introducing uniform tax rates on capital. We 
have checked robustness of these results with respect to high and low labour sup_· 
ply elasticities. These results are lower than those reported in Piggot and Whalley 
(1985) and Shoven and Whalley (1992) mainly because the benchmark year 1995 
had already witnessed significant amount of tax reform compared to the benchmark 
taxes in their studies. 
b. Sensitivity analysis of model results 
We check the robustness of the welfare impact results outlined above by means 
of sensitivity analysis of the results to four different sets of substitution elasticities 
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among assets (Ok) , keeping elasticities of substitution between labour and capital 
(ov) fixed; and four different sets of elasticities of substitution between labour and 
capital, keeping substitution elasticities among assets fixed .. Table 2 includes the 
results of sensitivity analysis for replacing the existing level of capital income taxes 
by yield preserving uniform capital income tax rates, for both low and high labour 
supply elasticities. 
For all pairs of elasticities, the welfare impacts of moving to a yield preserving 
capital income tax from a set of existing taxes is positive and almost linear in the 
value of substitution elasticities among assets, for a particular set of elasticities of 
substitution between labour and capital assets. Similarly, it is also almost linear in 
the values of substitution elasticities between capital and labour for any particular 
value of substitution elasticities among capital assets. 
Table 2: Sensitivity of aggregate welfare as a percentage of UK GDP to substitution 
elasticities between capital and labour, and to substitution elasticities across 
capital assets 
A. Labour supply elasticity 0.15 
c:::::::: ~ 0.75 1.0 3.0 5.0 
.... _~ff""""_//f[ __ / .. _~~"''' ___ ..... ,_~'"_~$*''_M' __ .'// __ ·-__ /_·~_· -,. ____ • _ _ -_ ...... 
0.75 0.01513 0.01705 0.0316 0.04594 
1.0 0.01951 0.0223 0.03607 0.05046 
3.0 0.04999 0.05252 0.06898 0.08426 
5.0 0.07694 0.08039 0.09992 0.11647 
B. Labour supply elasticity 0.3 oc:::;:-----------. M ___ " _ ,,, _' -.-~- --. .-~-.-•• -. -.-~ 
-.... ~ 0.75 1.0 3.0 5.0 
.... __ :.?v :::::... 
0.75 0.01496 
1.0 0.0193 
. .................. ... ...................... ............. ... . 
3.0 0.04947 
............ ......... 
5.0 0.07616 
0.01688 
0.02124 
0.05206 
0.07971 
0.03143 
0.03587 
................ .... ...... . 
0.06866 
0.09953 
Note: Ov is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour 
Ok is the elasticity of subs fit li t ion among capital assets. 
0.04576 
0.05026 
0.08399 
0.11618 
When both Ov and Ok are very high, each assuming a value of 5.0, the welfare 
impact of switching to a uniform ta,,\ rate was about 0.11 percent of UK GDP, which 
amounts to nearly £691 million. 
c. Reallocation of capital assets and labour in production 
Firms use capital and labour services in production. Following convention in 
general eq uilibrium analysis, before tax prices of these factors are set to unity in the 
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benchmark. Producers, or users of these inputs, however, pay the gross of tax prices 
but the owners of these factors receive net of tax payments. Government collects the 
tax revenue. In this model capital income taxes are collected at the sectoral level. 
The labour tax does not differ by sector and is collected from households6. 
In 15 out of 16 sectors, capital services are split between four different assets: 
buildings, short lived plant and machinery, long lived plant and machinery, and 
vehicles. Labour is homogeneous across all these sectors. The housing services sector 
is peculiar in terms of input use, as it uses dwellings as its only input. It uses none 
of the other assets nor any labour. Housing sector is isolated from other sectors. 
Table 3: Capital A sset Reallocation from Equal Yield Replacernent of Capital Income 
Taxes by Uniform Tax Rates By IndustlY (% Change in Capital Use (By 
Asset By Sector) 
Min -1.47 0.3 2.49 Min -0.6 0. 09 1.46 
Chern -8.98 ·-0.52 --5.79 7.88 Chern -5.15 -0.46 -3.63 4.58 
Metal - 11.62 ·-4.93 - 9.55 4.81 Metal -7.29 - 3.53 -6.41 2.54 
-12.06 --5.88 - 8.12 3.06 -8.76 -5.05 -6.51 0.92 
Food -5.87 ·-1.08 - 3.72 4.64 Food -5.51 - 1.24 - 3.82 4.52 
OTHMA -6.74 --1.97 - 3.45 4.24 OTHMA -7.04 -2.28 -3.85 4.69 
Power -6.26 0.38 20.12 6.89 Power -3.96 -0.02 12.92 4.29 
Constr -8.31 --1.15 0.85 1.92 Constr ··:/.91 - 1.23 0.86 1.86 
Distr -10.82 --1.66 4.68 Distr -6.6 - 1.24 2.82 3.31 
Trans - 11.56 3.34 9.65 Trans -7 1.99 5.97 - 0.76 
Fin 14.18 --8.78 --1.34 -2.01 Fin 9.42 - 5.6 -0.73 -1.25 
PubAD 18.89 --5.02 0.91 2.03 PlibAD 12.12 -3.27 0.58 1.19 
EducA 20.89 -2.55 1.96 EducA 13.39 - 1.54 1.22 
Note: The capital income tax rates lIsed here may be d(fferent from the capital income tax rates 
in use in the Inland Revenue. 
Equal yield uniform capital tax rate 26.5% 
A ggregate Welfare Effect: £21S.1 mill (95) = 0.0347% of" UK 1995 GDP 
Aggregate Welfare Effect: +£140 mill (95) ,= 0.0223% of" UK 1995 GDP 
Though sociaJ security, national insurance con tributions could be thought of as taxes on Jabour usc. 
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The relative prices of capital assets differ across sectors in the benchmark, mainly 
for the reason that capital income tax rates differ by assets and sectors. The equal 
yield uniform tax reform reduces these inter··sectoral and inter-asset differences 
in the relative user cost of capital in the counterfactual scenarios. Consequently 
we see a significant reallocation of capital and labour resources across sectors oc-
curring in comparison to the base year. 
The capital reallocation results in Table 3 show intra-asset reallocation of 
capital assets with the central case elasticity specification for both low and high 
labour supply elasticity cases. The model results confirm our assertion about the 
reallocation effects of changes in the relative prices. Based 011 changes in relative 
prices of capital between sectors, we expect more use of building type assets in 
the agriculture, extraction, financial services, public administration and education 
sectors. The relative prices of building type assets decrease in these sectors when 
capital income taxes become uniform across sectors and assets, compared to the 
benchmark relative prices. The sector··by-sector results in the first row in Table 3 
show that in the case of low labour supply elasticity, reallocation is actually hap-
pening in our model solutions. The use of building type assets increases by 21 
percent in education, 19 percent in public administration, 21 percent in extraction, 
14 percent in financial services, and around 2 percent in the agriculture sector. The 
use of buildings decreases in the other sectors because of a rise in the relative price 
of building assets in those sectors compared to the base year. 
The reallocation results for other assets, long and short lived plant and machinery 
and vehicles could also be interpreted in this manner. We see positive changes in 
the use of a particular asset in which the user cost of the asset has reduced relative 
to the base year. 
Besides inter-sectoral reallocation, we also see inter-asset substitution and capital 
labour reallocation after the uniform tax reform. Given that we have a fixed endow-
ment of each type of capital asset in both the benchmark and the counterfactual 
scenarios, total reallocation is subject to this capital stock constraint. 
Table 4: % Changes in Employment and Output Equal Yield Replacement of Capital In-
come Taxes By Uniform Tax Rates (Central case ~pecificalion of elasticities) 
----~--,---."---.. --~---,- --.. -.--~----.---, 
Industry 
Extra 
Minin 
Chemi 
Metal 
Food 
Labour 
% change in employment 
(labour use) 
·-0.989 
. ... .... ~ ~ ..... , .. 
·-0.843 
··-0.207 
4.758 
] .850 
0.352 
2.797 
elasticity 0.15 
% change in output 
-0.065 
1.606 
-0.367 
-0.251 
-0.731 
-0,970 
-0,044 
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Othma 
Power 
Constr 
Distr 
Trans 
Finan 
PubAD 
EducA 
House 
0.951 
4.084 
0.130 
. . ............•.•...•............ .... 
2.673 
1.818 
-4.757 
-0.827 
- 0.897 
- 0.241 
-0.262 
-0.040 
- 0.121 
-0.015 
0.124 
0.035 
0.107 
0.01 
.. ..... _ ..... 
Reallocation behveen asset types also occurs when the relative prices of these 
assets change in counterfactual scenarios. Inter-asset reallocation in response to 
capital tax reform is reflected in terms of positive changes for some assets, fol-
lowed by negative changes in the use of other assets within a sector. For every 
sector, some assets change positively and some other assets change negatively in 
response to the uniform tax reform. For instance, in the agriculture sector, use of 
the buildings type asset increases by 2 percent, use of plant and machinery with 
short life also increases by 2.8 percent, while there is a reduction of 5.3 percent in 
the use of vehicle type assets. 
The capital reallocation effect explained in this section is sensitive to elasticity 
configurations. We consider a unit elasticity case in Table 3.b. Generally the direc-
tion of changes in the allocation of assets is the same as in the central elasticity 
specification outlined in Table 3, while the magnitude of such changes is smaller 
for the unit elasticity specification than in the central elasticity specification. 
Besides inter-sectoral and inter-asset redistribution, changes in the relative user 
cost of capital have a significant effect on the use of labour across sectors. When 
capital inputs become relatively cheaper than the labour input, producers tend to 
substitute capital for labour. As outlined above, capital becomes relatively cheaper 
in certain sectors such as agriculture, finance, public administration, and education, 
and relatively expensive in some other sectors, particularly manufacturing, after a 
uniform tax reform. For this reason we see substitution between capital and labour 
in the model solutions. 
The figures in Table 4 show that replacing low capital income tax rates in the 
base year by a 26.5 percent uniform tax rate increases the user cost of capital in 
manufacturing sectors and some service sectors (chemicals, metals, engineering, 
food, other manufacturing, power, construction, distribution and transport). We 
see substitution of capital by labour in these sectors. Thus the effect of the reduc-
tion in capital assets is not completely compensated for by increased use of labour. 
Therefore output decreases in most of the manufacturing sectors, though not by as 
much as would have been warranted by the reduction in the use of capital in these 
sectors. Figures in Table 4 also show that labour is substituted by capital assets, 
because capital becomes less expensive, in the financial services and education 
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sectors. Benefiting from cheaper capital services, these sectors substitute capital 
for labour and experience positive changes in output. For instance, two extreme 
cases of factor substitution are seen in the financial and chemical sectors: capital 
substitutes for labour substantially in the financial sector while labour substitutes 
for capital in the chemical sector. 
d. Aggloegate Welfare for Indirect Tax Reform 
The basic UK model included here has four types of indirect taxes on inter-
mediate inputs and final demand: tariffs, subsidies, duties and levies, and value 
added tax. Rates of indirect taxes vary across sectors (Table AS in the appendix) 
and final demand categories as reported in the previous section. 
The aggregate welfare impacts of replacing a non-uniform indirect tax by a 
uniform tax rate and Jump sum taxes are reported in Table 5. 
For the central case specification, the welfare gain from replacing equal yield 
non-uniform VAT by uniform VAT was about 0.019 percent of UK GDP. Such a 
welfare gain occurs because of the removal of distortions caused by differentiated 
V AT rates in the base year. 
Equal yield replacement of all differentiated indirect tax rates by uniform tax 
rates across sectors leads to a gain of 0.017 percent of UK GDP. This figure is also 
very close to the gains from the uniform VAT case. 
Finally, when we replace indirect tax rates by an equal yield lump sum tax, the 
welfare gain rises to 1.72 percent of UK GDP (10.8 billion), which is bigger than 
in all the other tax experiments reported earlier. 
Table 5: Aggregate Welfare for other cases (as % of GDP) 
Equal Yield Replacement of non-uniform VAT By Uniform 
Rates - Central Case Specification of Elasticities 
Equal Yield Replacement of all indirect Taxes By Uniform 
indirect tax Rates 
Equa.l Yield Replacement of all indirect Taxes By equal yield 
lump-sum tax 
---' 
Equal Yield Replacement of household income taxes By equal 
yield lump-sum tax 
0.0186% of UKGDP 
0.01704% of UKGDP 
1,723% of UKGDP 
3.67% of UKGDP 
As the last equal yield scenario shows moving completely away from the house-
hold income tax to the lump sum income taxes generates even more efficiency gain 
equal to 3.67 percent of the GDP (21.98 billion). 
IV. Marginal Excess Burden of Taxes in the UK model 
The marginal excess burden (MEB) of taxes measures the extra cost to society, 
in terms of money metric welfare, of each pound of revenue raised by means of a 
certain tax instrument. We have computed the MEB for each tax instrument in-
cluded in the UK model by dividing the change in welfare (MVt) by the net change 
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in the government revenue (ARt). The net change in government revenue reflects 
the share (g) of revenue retained by the public sector. 
MEB = t.. Wt~_ 
t AD 
g·lll"t 
(32) 
The popular measure of the marginal excess burden of taxes, given by the area 
of the Harberger triangle, is related with the elasticity of demand for goods. Let 
P be the before tax price and P(l +t) be its after tax rate t is imposed in this com-
modity. Change in price is M, equal tax r ate and it changes demand by t..q. The 
area of triangle under the demand curve before and after taxes represents the dead 
weight loss of tax changes, which is dwl = ~~ t..q!¥J. This area is proportional to the 
2 
square of the tax rate and the elasticity of demand. The price elasticity of demand 
is e = ~'lJ2 . Then the relation between the change in quantity and the elasticity 
. !¥J q 
is t..q = !¥Jq e. Inserting this value of t..q in the equation for the dead weight loss 
p 
formula we get dwl = ~( t..~q }!¥J . The tax rate and change in prices are equal, 
. 1· A D 'I d l 1 2 eq 1· . 1 2 Imp ymg L.l.r = t ane w = - t· --; norma Ismgp = 1, dwl = - t eq. 
2 p 2 
The results show that MEB figures differ according to the type oftaxinstrument 
used to raise additional revenue. Results of the UK model in terms of changes in 
revenue, Hicksian EVs and MEB are given in Table 6. 
Table 6: Marginal Excess Burden a/Taxes (pence/£: low elasticity case) 
Low elasticity case High elasticity case 
l\1EB Change in Hicksian MEB Change in Hicksian Tax instrument money mon<~y revenue 
metricEV revenue metric EV 
income tax - 0.350 11305 -3962 -0.660 4449 - 2936 
Production tax -0.544 6585 -3582 - 0.673 876 -590 
Labour income tax -0.435 7984 -3473 - 0.580 8182 -4750 
-_ .. -.-
---- ~ - -- -------------- ~~~---
- ---- ------~-----
Household 
-0.517 6911 -3574 -0.669 4519 -3025" tax 
government - 0.540 6629 - 3578 - 0.540 6629 - 3578 
Indirect tax on 
- 0.542 6609 -3581 -0.614 344 -211 Investment goods 
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For the low labour supply elasticity case, the MEB ranges from 35 pence in 
the case of capital income taxes to 54 pence per pound of additional revenue from 
production taxes. If the MEB figures renect the degree of distortion for the tax 
instrument used to raise the additional revenue, production taxes in intermediate 
goods and indirect taxes on investment goods seem to be the most distortionary 
tax instruments in the UK economy. The marginal excess burdens (MEB) of all 
otper taxes are between these two figures. 
These MEB figures are comparable to theoretical and empirical results on MEB 
available in the literature. Theoretical studies about the marginal excess burden 
of taxes as reported in King (1983), Browning (1987), Mayshar (1990), Atkinson 
(1995) state how the excess burder of taxes can rise with extra amount of distor-
tionary taxes in an economy. On empirical side Piggott and Whalley (1985) stated 
that "about one quarter of the revenue raised by the UK government each year 
are foregone through dead weight loss". Shoven and Whalley (1984) summarising 
some earlier studies of tax reform studies state that "welfare loss per extra dollar 
of revenues raised from existing United States distortionary taxes may approach a 
dollar". BFSW(1985) and Fullerton and Rogers (1993) had slightly lower estimates 
of MEB. Our MEB estimate between 35 to 54 pence per pOllnd of additional rev-
enue is consistent with findings in the MEB literature. 
We find MEB measures to be sensitive to the elasticities of substitution in both 
the consumption and production sides of the economy. As figures in Tables 7 show, 
MEB figures are higher for higher values of elasticities compared to corresponding 
numbers with lower elasticities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The major findings from our study using the model are tlhe following: 
1. We show welfare gains when capital income tax rates existing in 1995 are replaced 
by a uniform yield preservirig 26.5 percent rate across sectors and assets for low 
labour supply elasticity. In the central case, we find an improvement in efficiency 
by 0.035 percent of UK GDP (£219 million). The improvement is 0.022 percent 
of UK GDP (£139 million) in the case of unit elasticity specification. 
2. The efficiency gain from replacing existing taxes by uniform capital income tax 
rates in the no equal yield capital tax reform was about 0.281 percent of UK 
GDP (£1.8 billion) for the low labour supply elasticity case and 0.283 for high 
elasticity case. The size of the government is allowed change in these cases and 
government consumption also is one component of aggregate welfare. 
3. The computed efficiency gain from replacing capital income tax by yield pre-
serving lump-sum taxes was 0.3 percent of UK GDP (1.9 billion). 
4. We check the robustness of the welfare results by means of sensitivity analysis. 
The welfare impacts of moving to a yield preserving capital income tax from a 
set of existing taxes is positive and almost linear in the values of substitution 
elasticities among assets (ak) for a particular set of elasticities of substitution 
between labour and capital assets (av) . Similarly, it is also linear in the values of 
substitution elasticities between capital and labour for any particular value of 
substitution elasticities among capital assets. When both a v and ak are very high, 
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each assuming a value of 5.0, the welfare impact of switching to a uniform tax rate 
was about 0.11 percent of UK GDP, which amounts to nearly £691 million. 
5. Changes in the relative prices of capital assets across sectors compared to the 
benchmark following the yield preserving capital income tax reform leads to a 
reallocation of capital assets across sectors. The equal yield uniform tax reform 
reduces the inter-sectoral and inter-asset differences in the relative user cost 
of capital in the counterfactual scenarios. Consequently we see a significant 
reallocation, up to a 20 percent increase or up to a 10 percent reduction in the 
use of capital assets in a low labour supply elasticity case and changes in the 
use of labour resources of between -5 and 5 percent across sectors, occurring 
in comparison to the base year. Both capital and labour reallocation effects are 
robust with respect to labour supply elasticity. 
6. When capital inputs become relatively cheaper than labour input, producers tend 
to substitute capital for labour; this happens in the agriculture, finance, public 
administration, and education sectors. Capital becomes relatively expensive in 
manufacturing sectors, after a uniform tax reform. We see substitution of capital 
by labour in these sectors. The effect of the reduction in capital assets is however 
not completely compensated for by increased use of labour. Therefore output levels 
decrease in most of the manufacturing sectors, though not by as much as would 
have been warranted by the reduction in the use of capital in these sectors. 
7. The marginal excess burden (MEB) of taxes is computed as a ratio of loss in 
welfare to a net change in government revenue. It varies according to the tax in-
struments in use for raising the additional pound of revenue. For the low labour 
supply elasticity case, the MEB ranges from 35 pence in case of capital income 
taxes to 54 pence per pound of additional revenue from production taxes. The 
effects of other taxes lie between these two numbers. If MEB figures reflect the 
degree of distortion for the tax instrument used to raise the additional revenue, 
production taxes in intermediate goods and indirect taxes on investment goods 
seem to be the most distortionary tax instruments in the UK economy. MEB 
figures are higher for higher values of labour supply elasticities compared to 
corresponding numbers for lower labour supply elasticities. These MEB figures 
are comparable to rates available in the literature (Shoven and Whalley (1984), 
Piggott and Whalley (1985) and BFSW(1985». 
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Table AI: Aggregation of 123 sectors into 16 sectors from 1990 Input-Output Sectoral 
Classification 
INDUSTRY/ 
ASSET 
Other mining 
& quarrying 
19901-0 Sectors 
Coal extraction, stone, clay, sand, gravel, metal 
ores and minerals 
1990 
sectoral 
code 
1,2,3 
5 
4,14, 10 
Chemica Is Coke ovens, oil proc, nuclear fuel, inorganic chemi- 6, 20-29 
cals, organic chemicals, fertil isers, s~mthetic: resins, 
paints, dyes, printing ink, special chemical for in-
dustry, pharmaccutical products, soap and toilet 
preparations, chemical products, man-made fibres 
._--_ .. ---, ... _--_._-----•.. -----,-_.--_ .. --------------_.---- -
Metals and 
mineral 
products 
Engineering 
Food, drinks 
and tobacco 
Iron and Steel, Aluminium, other non-ferrous 
metaHs, stmctural clay products, Cement, lime and 
plaster, concrete, asbestos, abrasive prods, glass, 
refractory and ceramic goods, metal casting, metal 
doors, windows, packaging products of metals, indus-
trial and steel work, engineers small tools 
Agricultural machinery and tractors, metal working 
machine tools, textile etc machinery, process ma-
chinery and contractors, mining equipment, mech 
power transmission equipment, other machinery, 
ordnance samll arms and ammunition, insulated 
wires and cables, basic electrical equipment, indus-
trial electrical equipment, telecommunications etc. 
equipment, electronic components, electronic con-
sumer goods, demestic electric appliances, electric 
equipment, instrument 
Oils and fats, slaughtering and meat processing, 
milk and products, fruit vegetable and fish process-
ing, grain milling and starch, bread, biscuits, sugar, 
confectionary, animal feeding stuffs, miscellaneous 
foods, alcoholic drink soft drinks, tobacco 
11-13, 15· 
19, 30-34, 
37 
35,36,38-
52,57 
58-70 
1995 
sectoral 
code 
1-3 
<' 
-' 
4,6,7 
35-46 
49-61 
62-76 
8-20 
Other manu-
facturing 
Motor vehicles and parts, shipbuilding and repair-
ing, aerospace etc, other vehicles, woollen and 
worsted, cotton spinning and weaving, hosiery 
and other knitted goods, textile finishing, car .. 
pets, jute, leather and leather goods, footwear, 
clothing furs, household and other textiles, timber 
and wood products, wooden furniture, pulp, paper 
and board, paper and board products, printing 
and publishing, rubber products, processing of 
plastics, jewellery and coins, sports goods and 
toys, other goods 
53-56, 71- 21-34, 47-
90 48,77-84 
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Electricity, Electricity production, gas, water supply 7,8,9 
and water 
Construction Construction 91 
Distribution, 
hotels, etc. 
Transport, 
storage, and 
communica-
tion 
Financial 
sector 
Wholesale distribution, retail distribution, dis- 92,93,94,95 
tribution and vehicles repairs, hotels catering, 
etc. 
Railways, road and other inland transport, sea 96-102 
transport, air transport, transport services, postal 
services, telecoomunication 
Banking and finance, insurance, alL'aliary financial 
services, estate agents, legal services, accountancy 
services, other professional services, advertising, 
computing services, other business services, rent-
ing of movables, owning and dealing in real estate, 
research and n"up l "nrrH'n 
103-114, 
118 
Public admin- Public administration 115 
istration 
Education, 
health and 
social work 
Housing 
services 
Sanita ry scrvices, education, health services, rec-
reation and welfa re services, personal services, 
domestic services 
Ownership of dwelling 
- - -- ---
Source: General equilibrium model of the UK economy. 
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Table A2: A 16 Sector Industry by Industry Input-Output Table of the United Kingdom 1995 
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Tabie A3: Industry by Industry Import Use Matrix for the UK economy 1995 
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Utilities 0 0 2 432 0 0 0 
Source: ONS, Input-Output Tables of the United Kingdom, 1995; Siddorn (199). 
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Table A4: Effective Tax rates on capital income by assets for year 1995 used in the 
UK tax model 
--,---'" 
_ _ ._w""_ """,,,_ ,,,,,_,,, __ ,y ___ , "'~_ 
P&M P&M P&M long INDUSTRY/ASSET J3uildings long: life short life Vehicles Dwellings life (new life '95) 
Agriculture 46.2 14.6 25.3 16.9 0.0 25.3 
Extraction 51.1 15.9 27.8 21.3 0.0 27.8 
__ , ______ • _____ _ __ M_~ ____ ._~~_, _ ____ ~~_~., •• _ • • ______ • h _ _ _ _ " ____ •• , ______ H~~_~', ___ 
Other mining 44.3 14.6 23.3 & 
Chemicals 39.9 13.0 17.9 
Metals and 39.7 12.0 17.1 
mineral 
Engineering 39.7 12.0 18.3 
Food, drinks 39.7 12.4 17.8 
and tobacco 
Other manufacturing 39.7 12.9 19.1 
____________ • __ ... __ ' __ ••• _ ___ • ___ __ __ . _,_. __ .~hh _ •••• _ _ __ ._. __________ ~ __ '" ____ 
Electricity, gas 
and water 
Construction 
Distribution, hotels, 
etc. 
40.8 
39.7 
39.7 
13.6 30.0 
14.6 23.5 
13.3 23.9 
21.3 0.0 23 .3 
21.3 0.0 17.9 
21.3 0.0 17.1 
21.3 0.0 18.3 
21.3 0.0 17.8 
22.7 0.0 19.1 
--.. --.----.'----~--~--.,-.... ----- -,~-.. -- ,',-_. 
21.3 0.0 30.0 
21.3 0.0 23.5 
21.3 0.0 23.9 
_ _ ,_. ___ ••• __ •• _ _____ _ ____ ,_<~ ___ _____ • _____ ~ _ _ . _'_'M_.~ .. _ _ ____ h _____ ' _ ________ • _____ _ 
Transport, storage, 
and communication 
Financial sector 
39.7 
50.7 
Public administration 50.7 
Education, health 
and social work 
Housing services 
51.3 
0.0 
16.4 
13.3 
13.3 
13.3 
0.0 
Source: P-Tax calculator, Inland Revenue 1998. 
26.5 
24.7 
23.8 
22.2 
0.0 
18.5 0.0 26.5 
21.3 0.0 24.7 
21.3 0.0 23.8 
. ,-... -----,-~ " -.--,---.. - ....... ,,-.--- -----~-,,~.,---
21.3 0.0 22.2 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table AS: Composite indirect tax rates on final demand expressed as percent of net 
prices for year 1995 
Tax on household 
consumption 
...........•.. -..•...... . . ... 
Tax on investment 
Domestic 
sales Imports 
Domestic 
sales Imports 
4.9 
Minin 5.4 5.4 
Chemi 163.1 167.2 
.. •. ......... .... .....•..........•....•................. 
Metal 17.3 
Foodd 
Othma 
Power 
Const 
Distr 
15.4 
47.5 
14.6 
9.0 
13.9 
12.8 
17.3 
16.9 
49.0 
16.0 
9.0 
14.0 
12.8 
Trans 
Finan 
5.9 8.7 
.......... • " .. ,., .. "." .. ' 
1.1 1.1 
Educa 6.3 7.5 
House -2.0 
........ - ...... . 
..................•...... .. ...... 
3.3 
5.0 
5.4 
2.4 
-2.2 
0.3 
Source: GE data set, Inland Revenue 1998. 
1.5 
.......... ,', ... .............. . 
4.7 
6.6 
6.8 
2.5 
0.3 
0.3 
Tax in government con-
sumption 
Domestic 
sales 
-7.1 
16.0 
14.7 
17.5 
16.6 
2.0 
10.8 
imports 
2.6 
16.0 
16.3 
17.:5 
18.2 
'3.1 
12.3 
- ~----.--.-,-.. -~.----.-..... -.--.-.-.--. 
16.9 
17.0 
7.9 
6.7 
6.1 
-0.8 
16.9 
17.1 
7.9 
9.3 
6.1 
0.3 

